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Abstract 
 
Federal statistical agencies in the United States and analogous agencies elsewhere commonly report official 
economic statistics as point estimates, without accompanying measures of error.  Users of the statistics may 
incorrectly view them as error-free or may incorrectly conjecture error magnitudes.  This paper discusses 
strategies to mitigate misinterpretation of official statistics by communicating uncertainty to the public.  
Sampling error can be measured using established statistical principles.  The challenge is to satisfactorily 
measure the various forms of nonsampling error.  I find it useful to distinguish transitory statistical 
uncertainty, permanent statistical uncertainty, and conceptual uncertainty.  I illustrate how each arises as the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis periodically revises GDP estimates, the Census Bureau generates household 
income statistics from surveys with nonresponse, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics seasonally adjusts 
employment statistics.  I anchor my discussion of communication of uncertainty in the contribution of 
Morgenstern (1963), who argued forcefully for agency publication of error estimates for official economic 
statistics. 
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"Perhaps the greatest step forward that can be taken, even at short notice, is to insist that economic statistics 
be only published together with an estimate of their error.  Even if only roughly estimated, this would produce 
a wholesome effect.  Makers and users of economic statistics must both refrain from making claims and 
demands that cannot be supported scientifically.  The publication of error estimates would have a profound 
influence on the whole situation." 
Morgenstern (1963a, pp. 304-305) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Government agencies commonly communicate official economic statistics to the public in news 
releases that make little if any mention of uncertainty in the reported estimates.  Technical publications 
documenting data and methods do acknowledge that official statistics are subject to error.  These publications 
sometimes provide guidance on the magnitude of sampling errors, but they generally do not attempt to 
quantify nonsampling errors. 
Some prominent American examples are the reporting of gross domestic product (GDP), 
employment, and household income by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), and Census Bureau. 
 
BEA Reporting of GDP Growth: The BEA reports quarterly estimates of GDP growth.  The agency initially 
reports an Aadvance@ estimate based on incomplete data and then reports revisions one and two months later as 
further data become available.  For example, a June 25, 2014 news release stated (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2014): 
"Real gross domestic product . . . decreased at an annual rate of 2.9 percent in the first quarter of 
2014 according to the "third" estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. . . . The GDP 
estimate released today is based on more complete source data than were available for the "second" 
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estimate issued last month. In the second estimate, real GDP was estimated to have decreased 1.0 
percent."  
Although this statement recognizes that estimates of GDP growth are subject to revision, BEA practice has 
been to report estimates without accompanying measures of potential error.  While the news release observed 
that the second estimate was based on incomplete data, it did not acknowledge that the third estimate was 
likewise based on incomplete data and would be revised further when data collected annually rather than 
quarterly became available. 
  A recent publication by BEA staff explains the practice of reporting estimates without measures of 
error as a response to the presumed wishes of the users of GDP statistics.  Fixler, Greenaway-McGrevy, and 
Grimm (2014) state (p. 2): 
"Given that BEA routinely revises its estimates during the course of a year, one might ask why BEA 
produces point estimates of GDP instead of interval estimates. . . . Although interval estimates would 
inform users of the uncertainty surrounding the estimates, most users prefer point estimates, and so 
they are featured. However, BEA provides the information that enables an interested user to construct 
their own interval estimate."   ~ 
 
BLS Reporting on Employment: On the first Friday of each month, the BLS issues The Employment Situation, 
a news release reporting official employment statistics for the previous month.  The reported unemployment 
rate is based on data on households sampled in the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The statistic giving 
growth in nonfarm employment is based on data collected from employer establishments sampled in the 
Current Employment Statistics survey.  For example, the BLS reported this on June 6, 2014 (U. S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2014a): "Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 217,000 in May, and the unemployment 
rate was unchanged at 6.3 percent."  Thus, the BLS reports employment statistics as point estimates, without 
measures of potential error. 
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A Technical Note issued with the news release contains a section on Reliability of the estimates that 
acknowledges the presence of errors.1  The section describes the use of standard errors and confidence 
intervals to measure sampling error, providing some numerical illustrations.2  It then turns to nonsampling 
errors, stating that they 
                                                 
1 See www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.tn.htm.  
2 For example, the Note accompanying the June 6, 2014 release states "the confidence interval for the 
monthly change in total nonfarm employment from the establishment survey is on the order of plus or minus 
90,000."  It explains that this is a 90-percent interval. 
"can occur for many reasons, including the failure to sample a segment of the population, inability to 
obtain information for all respondents in the sample, inability or unwillingness of respondents to 
provide correct information on a timely basis, mistakes made by respondents, and errors made in the 
collection or processing of the data." 
The Technical Note does not indicate the magnitudes of the nonsampling errors that may be present in the 
employment statistics.    ~ 
 
Census Reporting of Income Statistics: Each year the U. S. Census Bureau reports statistics on the income 
distribution based on data collected in the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) supplement to the CPS.  For 
example, in a news release issued September 12, 2012, the Census Bureau declared (U. S. Census Bureau, 
2012A): 
"The nation=s official poverty rate in 2011 was 15.0 percent, with 46.2 million people in poverty.  
After three consecutive years of increases, neither the poverty rate nor the number of people in 
poverty were statistically different from the 2010 estimates." 
Thus, the Census release provided point estimates, acknowledged but did not quantify sampling error, and did 
not mention nonsampling error. 
The Census Bureau's annual Current Population Report provides numerous statistics characterizing 
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the income distribution and measures sampling error by providing 90-percent confidence intervals for various 
estimates (U. S. Census Bureau, 2012B).  However, the report does not measure nonsampling errors.  A 
supplementary technical document describes some sources of nonsampling error, but it does not quantify 
them (U. S. Census Bureau, 2012C).           ~ 
 
Reporting official statistics as point estimates without adequate attention to error manifests a common 
tendency of policy analysts to project incredible certitude (Manski, 2011, 2013).  In the absence of agency 
guidance, some users of official statistics may naively assume that errors are small and inconsequential.  
Persons who understand that the statistics are subject to error must fend for themselves and conjecture the 
error magnitudes.  Thus, users of official statistics may misinterpret the information that the statistics provide. 
Why should misinterpretation be a concern?  A broad reason is that governments, firms, and 
individuals use official statistics when making numerous important decisions.  The quality of decisions may 
suffer if decision makers incorrectly take point estimates at face value or incorrectly conjecture error 
magnitudes.  For example, a central bank monitoring statistics on GDP growth, inflation, and employment 
may mis-evaluate the status of the economy and consequently set inappropriate monetary policy. 
Agencies could mitigate misinterpretation and better inform the nation about the state of the economy 
if they were to measure uncertainty in official statistics and communicate it regularly in their news releases 
and technical publications.  Using established statistical principles, it should be straightforward for agencies 
to communicate sampling error in statistics based on survey data.  A positive role model is the monthly 
release by the Census Bureau of statistics on new residential home sales in the previous month.  Expression of 
uncertainty is prominent in these releases.  For example, the one for March 2014 begins this way (U. S. 
Census Bureau, 2014): 
"Sales of new single-family houses in March 2014 were at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 
384,000, according to estimates released jointly today by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department 
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of Housing and Urban Development. This is 14.5 percent ("12.9%) below the revised February rate 
of 449,000 and is 13.3 percent ("9.9%) below the March 2013 estimate of 443,000." 
The Explanatory Notes section of the release states "All ranges given for percent changes are 90-percent 
confidence intervals and account only for sampling variability."  This transparent expression of sampling 
uncertainty could easily be emulated when the BLS and Census Bureau report employment and income 
statistics in their news releases.  Further precedent for communicating sampling uncertainty can be found in 
the news releases of private survey organizations, which routinely state a sampling "margin of error" when 
they report political polls and other survey findings.3 
It is more challenging to measure nonsampling errors for official statistics.  There are many sources of 
such errors and there has been no consensus about how to measure them.  The BLS Technical Note quoted 
earlier lists five types of nonsampling error in employment statistics but provides estimates of none of them.  
Numerous other typologies have been proposed in the literature on total survey error, which seeks to jointly 
characterize sampling and nonsampling error in statistics based on sample surveys. 
Groves and Lyberg (2010) provide an informative historical synthesis and critique of research on total 
survey error, tracing the literature from Deming (1944) through over a hundred subsequent contributions.  
Groves and Lyberg view the concept as most useful in guiding survey design, stating (pp. 849-850): 
"Total survey error is a concept that purports to describe statistical properties of survey estimates, 
incorporating a variety of error sources. For many within the field of survey methodology, it is the 
dominant paradigm. Survey designers can use total survey error as a planning criterion. Among a set 
of alternative designs, the design that gives the smallest total survey error (for a given fixed cost) 
should be chosen." 
Mulry and Spencer (1991, 1993) report a rare effort to measure total survey error in an important setting, 
                                                 
3 Groves and Lyberg (2010) call attention to the difference in practice between private and 
government  survey organizations, writing (p. 864): “Indeed, it is unfortunate that press releases of surveys 
sponsored by many commercial media remind readers of sampling error . . . . , while press releases of U. S. 
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examining the many errors that may affect enumeration of the population in the decennial census. 4 
In principle, assessment of the implications of total survey error should require specification of a loss 
function that measures how error affects a particular use of an official statistic.  Mulry and Spencer (1993) 
discuss various loss functions in the context of census enumeration.  Nevertheless, rather than choose a loss 
function specific to the use of a statistic, the prevalent practice has been to view the frequentist mean square 
error (mse) of an estimate as an appropriate omnibus measure of total survey error and to decompose the mse 
into the sum of variance and squared bias, measuring sampling and nonsampling error respectively. 
Statistical theory provides well-understood ways to measure variance but has been relatively silent on 
the measurement of bias.  Groves and Lyberg write (p. 868): 
                                                                                                                                                             
federal statistical agencies do not usually provide such warnings. 
4 The Census Bureau has sought to characterize total survey error in some of its surveys by 
undertaking and publishing a periodic "Quality Profile."  These profiles discuss nonsampling error at length, 
but they do not quantify them.  See, for example, Bureau of the Census (1998). 
"The total survey error format forces attention to both variance and bias terms. This is not a trivial 
value of the framework. Most statistical attention to surveys is on the variance termsClargely, we 
suspect, because that is where statistical estimation tools are best found. Biases deserve special 
attention because 
a. Their effect on inference varies as a function of the statistic; and 
b. They are studied most often through the use of gold-standard measurements, not internal 
replication common to error variance." 
The term "gold-standard measurements" refers to the availability of some external source of information 
assumed to provide an accurate measure of the statistic under study.  The literature on total survey error has 
largely been silent on measurement of nonsampling error when, as is usually the case in practice, no gold-
standard measurement is available.  For this and other reasons, Groves and Lyberg conclude (p. 874): "The 
paradigm has been more successful as an intellectual framework than a unified statistical model of error 
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properties of survey statistics." 
Acknowledgment that measurement of nonsampling errors is challenging does not justify the 
prevailing practice of government agencies.  Making good-faith efforts to measure both sampling and 
nonsampling error would be more informative than having agencies report official statistics as if they are 
truths.  I am not certain who first urged agencies to measure and report error, but comments by Simon 
Kuznets (1948) about Department of Commerce practices in defining and reporting the national income 
accounts show that this pioneer of official economic statistics recognized the importance of the matter early 
on.  Kuznets devoted a section of his article to “The Margins of Error” and wrote (p. 178): 
“What is urged here is more explicit and continuous consideration of margins of errors in economic 
statistics, particularly of the synthetic type involved in national income estimates. Neither the 
producers nor users of such estimates are inclined to devote much time to this problem; the former 
wish to arrive promptly at comprehensive and well articulated totals, the latter are eager to use the 
estimates to get light upon some question that seems to require urgent answer.  The very fact that the 
estimates are cast in the form of unique series, not of ranges, is itself an invitation to treat them as 
firm results and tends to discourage questioning whether a total of x billion might not just as well 
read x + a or x - a.  Consequently, users' attention should be called to the possibility of error, and 
experiments should be attempted on the ways in which the margins can be made known. It is not 
unlikely that, in the very process, means of actually improving the estimates themselves will be 
found.” 
Soon after Kuznets, Oskar Morgenstern argued forcefully for agency publication of error estimates in 
the conclusion to his book On the Accuracy of Economic Observations (Morgenstern, 1950, 1963a).5  
Summing up the lessons of his fifteen-chapter study of the many sources and manifestations of error, 
                                                 
5 The first edition of the book was published in 1950 and went out of print in 1952, Morgenstern 
subsequently greatly expanded and rewrote the book, publishing it as the second edition in 1963.  All 
mentions of the book in the present article refer to the second edition. 
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Morgenstern offered a damning indictment of the agencies that report official economic statistics to the 
public, writing (Morgenstern, 1963a, p. 304): 
"The process of improving data is an unending one. . . .There is, however, one area where definite 
action is possible, though it will take time before desirable results will become visible.  That is to stop 
important government agencies, such as the President's Council of Economic Advisors, the various 
government departments, the Federal Reserve Board and other agencies, public and private, from 
presenting to the public economic statistics as if these were free from fault.  Statements concerning 
month-to-month changes in the growth rate of the nation are nothing but absurd and even year-to-
year comparisons are not much better.  The same applies to variations in price levels, costs of living 
and many other items.  It is for the economists to reject and criticize such statements which are 
devoid of all scientific value, but it is even more important for them not to participate in their 
fabrication." 
He then called for regular publication of error estimates in the statement quoted at the beginning of this 
article, remarking that this is "Perhaps the greatest step forward that can be taken." 
More recently, the Committee on National Statistics (CNSTAT) of the National Research Council, a 
pillar of the statistical establishment in the United States, has embraced communication of uncertainty in 
official statistics in its publication Principles and Practices for a Federal Statistical Agency, which 
recommends that agencies adhere to various good practices.  Practice 4, titled "Openness About Sources and 
Limitations of the Data Provided," states this (National Research Council, 2013, p. 18): 
"A statistical agency should be open about the strengths and limitations of its data, taking as much 
care to understand and explain how its statistics may fall short of accuracy as it does to produce 
accurate data.  Data releases from a statistical program should be accompanied by a full description 
of the purpose of the program; the methods and assumptions used for data collection, processing, and 
reporting; what is known and not known about the quality and relevance of the data; sufficient 
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information for estimating variability in the data; appropriate methods for analysis that take account 
of variability and other sources of error; and the results of research on the methods and data." 
Unfortunately, federal statistical agencies have not adhered to the practice recommended by Kuznets, 
Morgenstern, and CNSTAT.  A BLS document on standards for information quality states that the agency 
applies the CNSTAT Principles and Practices, but it makes no explicit reference to nonsampling error (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014b).  Thirty years ago the Census Bureau convened a research conference on 
nonsampling error, at which Bureau Director John Keane announced initiation of an ambitious new 
“Nonsampling Error Exploration Program (Bureau of the Census, 1986, p. 186).  However, the Census 
Bureau still does not measure and report such errors.  The recent book-length document Statistical Quality 
Standards (U. S. Census Bureau, 2013) contains a section on "Producing Measures and Indicators of 
Nonsampling Error," but the section does not adequately engage the measurement problem.  In particular, the 
discussion of error due to survey nonresponse only calls for regular measurement of nonresponse rates, not for 
regular measurement of potential error due to nonresponse.6 
With this background, the present article considers how agencies might constructively measure and 
communicate some potentially important forms of error in official statistics.  In my discussion thus far, I have 
repeatedly invoked the traditional distinction between sampling and nonsampling error.  However, 
considering how to structure the article, I have decided that this distinction yields an ineffective organizing 
principle for what lies ahead. 
                                                 
6 A mandate for measurement of nonresponse error appears only in Sub-Requirement D3-3.6, which 
states (p. 58): 
"Nonresponse bias analyses must be conducted when unit, item, or total quantity response rates for 
the total sample or important subpopulations fall below the following thresholds. 
1. The threshold for unit response rates is 80 percent. 
2. The threshold for item response rates of key items is 70 percent. 
3. The threshold for total quantity response rates is 70 percent. (Thresholds 1 and 2 do not 
apply for surveys that use total quantity response rates.)" 
Thus, there is no requirement for analysis of bias if unit response is above 80 percent and item response is 
above 70 percent.  There is, moreover, no guidance on what would constitute an informative analysis of 
nonresponse bias. 
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Survey statisticians find it appealing to distinguish sampling errors from all others because statistical 
theory addresses measurement of sampling error but does not per se provide a foundation for measurement of 
other errors.  However, broad aggregation of nonsampling errors is too crude.  Speaking at the 1986 Census 
conference on nonsampling error, Director Keane recognized the aggregation problem well when he stated 
(Bureau of the Census, 1986, p. 185): 
“The diversity of nonsampling error is notably impressive.  It is impressive in its heterogeneity 
particularly when compared with the homogeneity of sampling error.  No wonder sampling error is so 
much easier to measure and, therefore, so much more frequently measured.  Perhaps the all-
encompassing term itself - - nonsampling error - - conceptually spans too much for operational clarity 
and clean measurement.” 
Considering the sources and implications of error from the perspective of users of economic statistics 
rather than the perspective of statisticians, I think it essential to distinguish errors in measurement of well-
defined concepts from uncertainty about the concepts that should be measured.  I also think it useful to 
distinguish errors that diminish with time from ones that persist.  To highlight these distinctions, I will 
separately discuss transitory statistical uncertainty, permanent statistical uncertainty, and conceptual 
uncertainty. 
Transitory statistical uncertainty arises because data collection takes time.  Agencies sometimes 
release a preliminary estimate of an official statistic in an early stage of data collection and revise the estimate 
as new data arrives.  Hence, uncertainty may be substantial early on but diminish as data accumulates.  When 
new data increase sample size under a fixed sampling plan, sampling uncertainty diminishes with time.  When 
new data yield observations on parts of a population that were not sampled earlier or more refined information 
on units sampled earlier, nonsampling uncertainty diminishes. 
Permanent statistical uncertainty arises from incompleteness or inadequacy of data collection that 
does not diminish with time.  Sampling uncertainty stemming from the finite ultimate size of survey samples 
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is permanent.  So is nonsampling uncertainty stemming from nonresponse and from the possibility that some 
respondents may provide inaccurate data. 
Conceptual uncertainty arises from incomplete understanding of the information that official statistics 
provide about well-defined economic concepts or from lack of clarity in the concepts themselves. Thus, 
conceptual uncertainty concerns the interpretation of statistics rather than their magnitudes.  Survey 
statisticians find it particularly difficult to study conceptual uncertainty because knowledge of statistical 
theory does not suffice.  A substantive understanding of the potential uses of official statistics is necessary. 
To exemplify transitory statistical uncertainty, Section 2 considers BEA initial measurement of GDP 
and the ensuing process of revising the estimate as new data arrives.  Section 3 addresses permanent statistical 
uncertainty due to nonresponse in sample surveys, using nonresponse to income questions in the CPS to 
illustrate.  Section 4 discusses the conceptual uncertainty inherent in BLS seasonal adjustment of employment 
statistics. 
I could usefully discuss many more exemplars of the three types of uncertainty, such as temporal 
revision of inflation statistics, response errors in surveys, and conceptual uncertainty in definitions of poverty, 
unemployment, GDP, inflation, and other macroeconomic indices. However, this article would then quickly 
become book length.  It would become more than book length if I were to attempt to review and assess the 
large academic research literatures that seek to shed light on the nature and implications of data revisions, 
survey nonresponse and error, seasonal adjustment of time series, and alternative definitions of 
macroeconomic indices.  Hence my citation of research literature will be highly selective, the main aim being 
to present ideas about communication of uncertainty in official statistics. 
I have sub-titled the article "An Appraisal Fifty Years after Morgenstern" because I think that On the 
Accuracy of Economic Observations was an important contribution.  Its virtues include a compelling basic 
message and many specific insights, albeit embedded within a daunting mass of detail that may 
understandably put off potential readers.  Although Morgenstern achieved lasting fame among economists 
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through his collaboration with John von Neumann in the development of game theory, he was close to a lone 
voice in his concern with error in official economics statistics.  His book attracted notice and some 
controversy early on.7  However, it has since faded from the attention of economists and appears not to have 
yielded any action by the statistical agencies.  My impression is that present-day users of official statistics are 
largely unaware of the book's existence.8  In what follows, I cite passages from the book where appropriate 
and also call attention to other contributions that warrant recognition by economists today. 
 
 
                                                 
7 An instance of controversy is an exchange between Raymond Bowman and Morgenstern in The 
American Statistician.  Bowman was Assistant Director for Statistical Standards at the U.S. Bureau of the 
Budget.  Commenting on an article by Morgenstern in the magazine Fortune that summarized his book for a 
general audience (Morgenstern, 1963b), Bowman (1964) acknowledged some of Morgenstern's concern with 
error in official statistics.  However, Bowman downplayed the severity of the problem and expressed 
disappointment that Morgenstern had not done more to propose procedures that would reduce error.  
Morgenstern (1964) reacted strongly in defense of his work, restating his indictment of government practices 
that interpret published statistics as if they are essentially error free. 
8 The book does, however, continue to draw occasional attention from scholars who study the history 
of economic thought.  See Kenessey (1997) and Boumans (2012). 
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2. Transitory Uncertainty: Revisions in National Income Accounts 
 
2.1. Bureau of Economic Analysis Reporting of GDP 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports quarterly estimates of 
GDP.  The BEA initially reports an advance estimate based on incomplete data available one month after the 
end of a quarter.  It reports second and third estimates after two and three months, when additional data 
become available.  In the summer of each year, when more extensive data collected on an annual rather than 
quarterly basis become available, BEA reports a first annual estimate and then revises it further in subsequent 
years.  Every five years, the BEA re-evaluates its operational definition of GDP and accordingly makes yet 
further revisions to the historical GDP record.  I will not discuss the five-year revisions here because they 
concern conceptual rather than statistical uncertainty. 
An article describing the measurement of GDP explains the reasons for revisions as follows 
(Landefeld, Seskin, and Fraumeni, 2008, p. 194): 
"For the initial monthly estimates of quarterly GDP, data on about 25 percent of GDPCespecially in 
the service sectorCare not available, and so these sectors of the economy are estimated based on past 
trends and whatever related data are available. . . . . The initial monthly estimates of quarterly GDP 
based on these extrapolations are revised as more complete data become available. . . . . The 
successive revisions can be significant, but the initial estimates provide a snapshot of economic 
activity much like the first few seconds of a Polaroid photograph in which an image is fuzzy, but as 
the developing process continues, the details become clearer." 
How large do the revisions to the BEA estimates tend to be?  Consider the month-to-month revisions 
for the first quarter of 2014.  The news release quoted in the Introduction stated that the second and third 
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estimates were -1.0 and -2.9 percent respectively. The advance estimate was +0.1 percent.9  Thus, an advance 
estimate of small growth was revised to a third estimate of substantial decline two months later. 
The revisions in first quarter 2014 were atypically large, but substantial revisions are common.  
Fixler, Greenaway-McGrevy, and Grimm (2011) report that the mean absolute revision (MAR) from the 
advance estimates to the second estimates of real GDP is 0.5 percentage points, that from the advance 
estimates to the third estimates is 0.6 percentage points, and that from the second to the third estimates is 0.3 
percentage points.  Considering the period 1983B2009, they report that the overall MARs to the advance, 
second, and third quarterly estimates (comparing these estimates with the latest available for the relevant 
quarter) were 1.31, 1.29, and 1.32 percentage points.  Observing that the magnitude of the revisions tends not 
to diminish with time, despite the availability of more data when forming the second and third estimates, the 
authors state (p. 12): "The lack of declines in the MARs of GDP in successive vintages of current quarterly 
estimates is a phenomenon that has been noted in nearly all of BEA's analyses of revisions."  However, Fixler, 
Greenaway-McGrevy, and Grimm (2014) report that the magnitude of revisions does tend to diminish with 
time in the period 1993-2012. 
 
2.2. The Substantive Significance of Revisions 
 
While the magnitudes of revisions to BEA estimates of GDP are straightforward to compute, the 
substantive significance of the revisions is a matter of interpretation.  Fixler, Greenaway-McGrevy, and 
Grimm (2011) remark at their beginning of their article that (p. 9): 
"Economic policy decisions should not need to be reconsidered in the light of revisions to GDP 
estimates, and policymakers should be able to rely on the early estimates as accurate indicators of the 
                                                 
9 See www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp1q14_adv.pdf for the news release giving 
the advance estimate. 
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state of the economy." 
They provide an upbeat absolute perspective in the conclusion to their article, stating (p. 30):  "The estimates 
of GDP and GDI are accurate; the MARs for both measures are modestly above 1.0 percentage point."  
Landefeld, Seskin, and Fraumeni (2008) provide an upbeat comparative perspective, stating (p. 213): 
"In terms of international comparisons, the U.S. national accounts meet or exceed internationally 
accepted levels of accuracy and comparability. The U.S. real GDP estimates appear to be at least as 
accurateCbased on a comparison of GDP revisions across countriesCas the corresponding estimates 
from other major developed countries." 
Croushore (2011) offers a considerably more cautionary perspective, stating (p. 73): 
"Until recently, macroeconomists assumed that data revisions were small and random and thus had no 
effect on structural modeling, policy analysis, or forecasting.  But realtime research has shown that 
this assumption is false and that data revisions matter in many unexpected ways." 
To illustrate, he gives a notable example (p. 73): 
"In January 2009, in the middle of the financial crisis that began in September 2008, the initial 
release of the national income accounts showed a decline in real gross domestic product (GDP) of 3.8 
percent (at an annual rate) for the fourth quarterCa bad number for sure but not as bad as might be 
expected considering the damage caused by the financial meltdown.  But one month later, the GDP 
growth rate was revised down by 2.4 percentage points, showing a decline in real GDP of 6.2 percent 
and confirming that the U.S. economy was in the middle of the worst recession in over twenty-five 
years. The 2.4 percentage point downward revision from the initial release to the first revised number 
was the largest revision ever recorded for quarterly real GDP.  Real-time data analysis of the history 
of revisions of real GDP shows us that the largest revision came at a very inopportune moment." 
This example is an extreme case, but it provides a stark warning that BEA revisions to GDP may be 
quite large and occur at times when vital policy decisions must be made.  Leaving aside the singular event of 
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the financial crisis, I view the MARs reported by Fixler, Greenaway-McGrevy, and Grimm (2011) for the 
period 1983B2009 as too large to warrant their upbeat conclusion that BEA quarterly estimates of GDP are 
accurate.  A statement made by Croushore (2011) seems more on the mark (p. 77):  "If monetary policy 
depends on short term growth rates, then clearly policy mistakes could be made if the central bank does not 
account for data uncertainty." 
Related reservations were expressed by Morgenstern.  Chapter XIV of Morgensten (1963a) 
scrutinizes the construction of national income statistics.  Section 2, on "Concepts of National Statistics" 
describes the substantial revisions that result from periodic conceptual changes in the definition of national 
income.  Section 7, on "Absolute Size of the Estimates: Relative Changes and Revision" considers the 
statistical revisions made as new information becomes available.  Summarizing the situation, he writes (p. 
268): "These observations, incidentally, should be viewed as casting serious doubts on the usefulness of 
national income figures for business cycle analysis."  Presenting further evidence on the significance of 
revisions, Morgenstern (1964) presents a table showing that estimates of annual growth in national income in 
the United States in the period from 1947 to 1962 sometimes vary widely depending on whether one uses 
initial estimates, last estimates, or other specified revisions to compute the growth rates. 
 
2.3. Measuring Uncertainty due to Revisions 
 
Informative communication of the transitory uncertainty of GDP estimates should be relatively easy 
to accomplish.  The historical record of BEA revisions has been made accessible for study in two "real-time" 
data sets maintained by the Philadelphia and St. Louis Federal Reserve Banks.  See Croushore (2011) for 
details regarding these data sets and similar ones for other nations.  An early example of a real-time data set 
appears in Morgenstern (1963a, pp. 249-250) as Table 23, which presents the revisions to estimates of 
national income made in the period 1947 through 1961. 
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Measurement of transitory uncertainty in GDP estimates is straightforward if one finds it credible to 
assume that the revision process is time-stationary.  Then historical estimates of the magnitudes of revisions 
can credibly be extrapolated to measure the uncertainty of future revisions.  A particularly simple 
extrapolation would be to suppose that the historical overall MAR of 1.3 percentage points reported by Fixler, 
Greenaway-McGrevy, and Grimm (2011) will persist going forward.  More broadly, it may be credible to 
suppose that the empirical distribution of revisions will persist going forward. 
More refined measures of uncertainty can be developed by studying how the magnitude and direction 
of historical revisions have varied with the state of the economy.  Such refinements may be important to the 
extent that the nature of revisions tends to vary over the business cycle (see Croushore, 2011, Sec. 2.2).  If 
there is reason to think that the historical pattern of variation of revisions with the state of the economy will 
persist into the future, then it would be appropriate to measure the transitory uncertainty of future GDP 
estimates in a manner that conditions on the state of the economy. 
A notable precedent for probabilistic communication of the transitory uncertainty in GDP estimates is 
the periodic release of fan charts by the Bank of England.  I describe the British practice below. 
 
2.4. Fan Chart Reports of GDP Growth by the Bank of England 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) reports quarterly estimates of GDP in 
a manner similar to the BEA, with no quantitative measurement of uncertainty despite the fact that the 
estimates are revised regularly.  For example, the April 2014 edition of the monthly Economic Review of the 
ONS describes the most recent GDP revisions as follows (U. K. Office for National Statistics, 2014, p. 1): 
"The Quarterly National Accounts left Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the final quarter of 
2013 unrevised at 0.7%, but reduced annual growth in 2013 to 1.7%, largely as a consequence of 
lower than previously estimated household expenditure." 
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Unlike those in the United States, users of GDP estimates in the UK have ready access to a measure 
of transitory uncertainty in the fan charts reported by the Bank of England in its monthly Inflation Report.  
Figure 1 reproduces a fan chart for annual GDP growth in the February 2014 Inflation Report (Bank of 
England, 2014).  The part of the plot showing growth from late 2013 on is a probabilistic forecast that 
expresses the uncertainty of the Bank=s Monetary Policy Committee regarding future GDP growth.  The part 
of the plot showing growth in the period 2009 through mid-2013 is a probabilistic forecast that expresses 
uncertainty regarding the revisions that ONS will henceforth make to its estimates of past GDP.  The Bank 
explains as follows (p. 7): "In the GDP fan chart, the distribution to the left of the vertical dashed line reflects 
the likelihood of revisions to the data over the past." 
Observe that Figure 1 expresses considerable uncertainty about GDP growth in the period 
2010B2013.  Moreover, it expresses comparable uncertainty about growth in the recent past and the near 
future.  Thus, the Bank judges that future ONS revisions to estimates of past GDP may be large in magnitude. 
 
Figure 1: February 2014 UK GDP Fan Chart 
(Source: Bank of England) 
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3. Permanent Uncertainty: Nonresponse in Surveys 
 
3.1. Nonresponse in the CPS 
 
Nonresponse is common in the surveys used to compute important official statistics.  Unit and item 
nonresponse may make key data missing for substantial fractions of the persons sampled.  For example, there 
is considerable nonresponse to the ASEC-CPS income questions used to produce the poverty statistics cited in 
the Introduction.  During the period 2002-2012, 7 to 9 percent of the sampled households yielded no income 
data due to unit nonresponse and 41 to 47 percent of the interviewed households yielded incomplete income 
data due to item nonresponse (Manski, 2014).10 
                                                 
10 The ASEC questionnaire asks each member of the household about eighteen separate income 
components, ranging from earnings and pensions to dividends and public assistance.  To determine total 
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Yet the Census Bureau news release (U. S. Census Bureau, 2012a) cited in the Introduction provides 
no explanation of how the Census Bureau forms a point estimate of the income distribution in the presence of 
such high nonresponse.  Indeed, the release does not mention nonresponse at all.  Similarly, the monthly BLS 
news release reporting the current unemployment rate (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014a) is silent on 
unit and item nonresponse to the CPS question used to estimate unemployment.  These practices encourage 
readers of the Census and BLS releases to think that nonresponse is inconsequential.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
household income, the Census Bureau sums the responses obtained for these income components across the 
members of the household.  The ASEC data shows a wide range of item nonresponse patterns, as households 
differ in the data they provide about the various income components.  For example, nonresponse to the 
question asking for earnings on the primary job ranges from 17 to 19 percent over the ten-year period.  
Nonresponse to the question on interest income ranges from 23 to 27 percent over the period. Nonresponse on 
dividend income ranges from 9 to 12 percent. 
3.2. Nonresponse Imputations and Weights 
 
Informed users of sample surveys such as the CPS are aware that, to form estimates in the presence of 
nonresponse, statistical agencies assume that nonresponse is random conditional on specified observed 
covariates.  These assumptions are implemented as weights for unit nonresponse and imputations for item 
nonresponse. 
In particular, the Census Bureau applies hot-deck imputations to the CPS and other surveys, 
describing the hot deck this way (U. S. Census Bureau, 2006, p. 9-2): 
"This method assigns a missing value from a record with similar characteristics, which is the hot 
deck.  Hot decks are defined by variables such as age, race, and sex.  Other characteristics used in hot 
decks vary depending on the nature of the unanswered question.  For instance, most labor force 
questions use age, race, sex, and occasionally another correlated labor force item such as full- or part-
time status." 
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Thus, agency staff select a vector of covariates for which response is complete and determine the empirical 
distribution of the item of interest among sample members who have this covariate value and who report the 
item.  A value for the item is imputed to a sample member with missing data by drawing a realization from 
the available empirical distribution. 
The CPS documentation of hot-deck imputation offers no evidence that the method yields values for 
missing data that are close to the actual values.  Another Census Bureau document describing the American 
Housing Survey is revealing.  The document states (U. S. Census Bureau, 2011): 
"Some people refuse the interview or do not know the answers.  When the entire interview is missing, 
other similar interviews represent the missing ones . . . . For most missing answers, an answer from a 
similar household is copied.  The Census Bureau does not know how close the imputed values are to 
the actual values." 
Indeed, lack of knowledge of the closeness of imputed values to actual ones is common. 
Researchers have expressed varying views on the adequacy of Census imputations.  Considering 
imputation methodology in generality, some argue paternalistically that the staff of statistical agencies are 
better able to make decisions about treatment of missing data than are data users and, moreover, that 
imputation simplifies life for data users.  A clear statement of this perspective appears in Meng (1994), who 
writes (p. 538): 
"A common technique for handling incomplete observations is to impute them before any substantive 
analysis.  An obvious reason for the popularity of imputation, from a computational point of view, is 
that it allows users of the data to apply standard complete-data techniques directly.  From an 
inferential point of view, perhaps, the most fundamental reason for imputation is that a data 
collector's assessment and information about the data, both observed and unobserved, can be 
incorporated into the imputations.  In other words, imputation sensibly divides the tasks for analyzing 
incomplete data by assigning the difficult task of dealing with nonresponse mechanisms to those who 
 
 
22 
are more capable of handling them, while allowing users to concentrate on their intended complete-
data analyses." 
Many users of Census Bureau surveys appear to appreciate the simplification of data analysis that 
imputation yields.  Considering Census income imputations, Lillard, Smith, and Welch (1986) comment: 
"Because much of what we think we know about income distributions and determinants of earnings is 
derived from studies of the censuses and CPSs, findings are sensitive to the treatment of non-
reporters.  Even so, the economic research community has ignored the problem, accepting census 
imputations as fully equivalent to reported values.  In five leading economics journals during the last 
decade, over 100 articles used census or CPS data for studies of income; not one of them attempted to 
deal with the potential problems caused by non-random refusal to report.  Part of this oversight may 
be attributed to tacit acceptance of census imputations and part may stem from inertia because many 
of the early releases of public-use tapes did not identify imputed values." 
Lillard, Smith, and Welch express concern that empirical economists use census imputations as if 
they were real data.  In particular, they question the maintained assumption that nonresponse is conditionally 
random.  At the end of their extensive study of Census imputation processes, they conclude (p. 505): "we are 
left with a real concern about the accuracy of the income data that underlie a good deal of empirical economic 
research." 
Reading Morgenstern, I find it striking that his entire dense book makes almost no mention of survey 
nonresponse.  The only reference to it appears in Chapter XIII, on Employment and Unemployment Statistics. 
A footnote describing the CPS notes the presence of some unit nonresponse, stating that about 1500 
households within a sample of about 35,000 households are not interviewed (p. 219, footnote 3).  Later in the 
chapter, Morgenstern observes that this (p. 233) "failure to obtain responses from a small proportion of 
designated sampling units" may be a source of error in labor force statistics.  I am aware of no mention of 
item nonresponse anywhere in the book, nor any mention of weighting or imputation as means of dealing with 
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nonresponse. 
Given that Morgenstern describes many sources of error in official statistics in considerable detail, the 
absence of attention to survey nonresponse calls for explanation.  I conjecture that Morgenstern considered 
nonresponse to be a relatively small problem in his era and so chose not to delve into it.  The rate of CPS unit 
nonresponse that he cited was only about four percent.  Lillard, Smith, and Welch (1986) observe that 
nonresponse has grown considerably with timeCthey report that item nonresponse to CPS income questions 
increased from 5.3 percent in 1948 to 26.6 percent in 1982 (p. 491, Table 1).  As mentioned earlier, item 
nonresponse has become even more pronounced recently (Manski, 2014).  When Morgenstern wrote his book 
in the early 1960s, he may not have anticipated that nonresponse would develop into the substantial problem 
that it has since become. 
 
3.3. Measuring Uncertainty due to Nonresponse 
 
Whereas imputations and weights embody the strong and often untenable assumption that 
nonresponse is conditionally random, econometric research on partial identification has shown how to 
measure uncertainty due to nonresponse without making any assumptions about the nature of the missing 
data.  The idea, simply enough, is to contemplate all the values that the missing data might take.  Doing so, 
the available data yield interval rather than point estimates of official statistics. See Manski (1989, 1994, 
2003, 2007), Horowitz and Manski (1998, 2000), and Stoye (2010) inter alia.  Econometricians have also 
shown how to form confidence intervals that jointly measure sampling and nonresponse error (e.g., Horowitz 
and Manski, 2000; Imbens and Manski, 2004; Stoye 2009).  Thus, we know how to measure uncertainty for 
official statistics with survey nonresponse. 
Determination of no-assumptions interval estimates is particularly easy when the statistic of interest is 
the mean or a quantile of an item.  To obtain the lower (upper) bound of the interval, one supposes that all 
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cases of nonresponse take the lowest (highest) logically possible value of the item and computes the resulting 
statistic.  Thus, computation of the interval estimate just requires two extreme imputations of each case of 
missing data.11 
                                                 
11 This procedure is valid for no-assumptions interval estimation of any statistic that respects 
stochastic dominance (see Manski, 2003, Sec. 1.3).  Means and quantiles are leading examples.  It is not valid 
for interval estimation of a spread statistic such as the variance or interquantile range of an item.  Blundell et 
al. (2007) and Stoye (2010) derive no-assumptions intervals for spread statistics. 
A notable early precedent in the survey statistics literature was the Cochran, Mosteller, and Tukey 
(1954, pp. 274-282) consideration of the potential implications of nonresponse in the Kinsey survey of male 
sexual behavior.  Considering an item with yes/no response options, they observed that the smallest (largest) 
possible value of the frequency of a yes response occurs if all missing data take the no (yes) value.  However, 
the subsequent literature did not follow up on the idea.  Summarizing his earlier work with Mosteller and 
Tukey, Cochran (1977) chose not to recommend further analysis of this type.  Using the symbol W2 to denote 
the nonresponse rate, he stated (p. 362): "The limits are distressingly wide unless W2 is very small." 
Indeed, no-assumptions interval estimates of statistics on the income distribution are distressingly 
wide given the high rate of nonresponse to the ASEC-CPS income questions.  Manski (2014) used ASEC data 
collected in 2002-2012 to form interval estimates of median household income and the fraction of families 
with income below the official poverty threshold in the years 2001-2011.  I reported one set of estimates that 
make no assumptions about item nonresponse but suppose that unit nonresponse is random.  Another set of 
estimates make no assumptions about either item or unit nonresponse. 
The estimates show vividly that item nonresponse poses a huge potential problem for inference on the 
American income distribution, and that unit nonresponse exacerbates the problem.  For example, the interval 
estimate for the family poverty rate in 2011 is [0.14, 0.34] if one make no assumptions about item response 
but assumes that unit nonresponse is random.  The interval is [0.13, 0.39] if one drops the assumption that unit 
nonreponse is random. 
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I also used monthly CPS data to form interval estimates of the unemployment rate in March of 2002-
2012.  While item nonresponse is a relatively minor source of error for the unemployment rate, unit 
nonresponse is highly consequential.  When unit nonresponse is assumed random but nothing is assumed 
about item nonresponse, the interval estimate for the unemployment rate in March 2012 is [0.08, 0.09]. When 
the assumption of random unit nonresponse is dropped, the interval is [0.07, 0.16]. 
Observing the substantial width of no-assumption interval estimates of the income distribution and 
unemployment rate, one might judge that the Census Bureau and BLS should not bother to report them 
because the intervals are "too wide to be informative."12 Nevertheless, I would argue that federal statistical 
agencies should report such intervals as they endeavor to communicate uncertainty to the public.  
                                                 
12 I place the phrase "too wide to be informative" in quotation marks because I have often heard 
colleagues use this or a similar phrase when discussing interval estimates that make no assumptions about the 
nature of nonresponse. 
Whatever their width may be, interval estimates obtained without assumptions on nonresponse are 
valuable for several reasons.  First, they are easy to compute and understand.  Second, they are maximally 
credible in the sense that they express all logically possible values of the statistic of interest.  I have long 
emphasized that beginning with the data alone establishes a domain of consensus among the users of statistics 
and serves to bound disagreements about their interpretation (Manski, 1995, 2007).  Third, no-assumptions 
interval estimates make explicit the fundamental role that assumptions play in inferential methods that yield 
tighter findings.  Wide bounds reflect real data uncertainties that cannot be washed away by assumptions 
lacking credibility. 
The above argument does not imply, of course, that statistical agencies should refrain from making 
assumptions about nonresponse.  Interval estimates obtained with no assumptions may be excessively 
conservative if agency analysts have some understanding of the nature of nonresponse.  There is a vast middle 
ground between interval estimation with no assumptions and point estimation assuming that nonresponse is 
conditionally random.  Manski (2003, Chapters 1 and 2; 2007, Chapters 3 and 4) and Stoye (2010) 
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characterize the identifying power of various such assumptions.  Given the historical prominence of 
assumptions that nonresponse is random, agencies may find it appealing to consider assumptions formalizing 
the conjecture that missing data are not too different from observed data.  Such assumptions may directly 
constrain the distribution of missing data or may constrain the response propensities of persons with different 
outcomes.  Manski (2014) suggests some alternatives that statistical agencies may want to consider.   
It is unlikely that any one middle-ground assumption will be appropriate in all settings.  Hence, I will 
not propose adoption of any particular assumption for reporting of official statistics.  A particularly simple 
broad idea is to use available information to conjecture an interval within which each missing data item lies.  
Thus, one would impute an interval of values when nonresponse occurs.  This idea encompasses the two poles 
of traditional point imputation, in which the imputed interval contains only one value, and the no-assumption 
interval, in which the imputed interval contains all logically possible values of the item.  Middle-ground 
assumptions impute intervals that are larger than a point but smaller than all logically possible values.13  
 
3.4. Reducing Nonresponse 
 
While the focus of this article is communication of uncertainty in official statistics, I would be remiss 
not to mention the efforts that survey designers do or might make to reduce nonresponse.  Research on survey 
methodology has long sought to understand how survey mode (e.g., face-to-face, telephone, internet), 
participation incentives, questionnaire length, and the wording of questions affect unit and item nonresponse.  
Research on total survey error has encouraged survey planners to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative 
                                                 
13 The interval imputation described here differs fundamentally from the "multiple imputation" 
studied in Rubin (1987).  The latter assumes that data are missing at random conditional on specified 
covariates.  In a manner similar to the hot-deck method, one determines the empirical distribution of the item 
among sample members who have this covariate value and imputes a value to each sample member with 
missing data by drawing a realization at random from the empirical distribution.  The word "multiple" refers 
to carrying out this process multiple times, creating multiple artificial data sets.  The aim is to appropriately 
characterize the sampling uncertainty resulting from imputation. 
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designs.  Spencer (1985) goes further and proposes benefit-cost analysis of alternative designs. 
When considering nonresponse, an instructive cost-effectiveness exercise begins with a specified 
design and asks whether a marginal increase in survey budget should be used to increase the size of the 
sample or to reduce nonresponse among existing sample members.  Whereas the former use of budget reduces 
sampling uncertainty alone, the latter may reduce sampling and nonsampling uncertainty.  Cochran, 
Mosteller, and Tukey (1954) reported an exercise of this type in the context of the Kinsey survey with no 
assumptions on nonresponse, using mean square error as the measure of total survey error.  Horowitz and 
Manski (1998) reported a similar exercise in the context of CPS estimation of the national unemployment rate 
with no assumptions on nonresponse, using the confidence interval on the unemployment rate as the measure 
of total survey error.  Both exercises suggest criteria for deciding when efforts to reduce nonresponse may be 
cost-effective. 
In some cases, a feasible alternative to reduction of nonresponse may be to obtain administrative data 
that are informative about missing survey items.  In particular, consider nonresponse to income questions in 
the CPS.  The 1973 CPS-IRS-SSA Exact Match Study, described in Kilss and Scheuren (1978), was an 
ambitious joint effort of the Census Bureau and the Social Security Administration to match the sample of 
respondents to the March Income Supplement to the CPS (now known as the ASEC Supplement) to their 
Social Security benefit and earning records as well as to some information in their federal income tax returns. 
 In principle, match studies of this type can be informative not only about CPS nonresponse but also about the 
accuracy of the data provided by CPS sample members who respond to the income questions. Kilss and 
Scheuren write (p. 15): 
"The 1973 study was designed with a great number of specific goals in mind. . . . The primary 
interest of the Bureau of the Census, for example, was to evaluate and, potentially, to find ways of 
improving upon the procedures it employs in carrying out the Current Population Survey. . . It is 
important to add that the Exact Match Study was also looked upon as an intermediate step in the 
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construction of Acorrected@ personal income-size distributions of the U S population." 
I find the latter goal intriguing.  It suggests the possibility of using SSA and IRS records to revise the 
estimates of the income distributions that are presently based purely on CPS responses.  If the ASEC-CPS 
sample were matched with their SSA and IRS records each year, the result could be a data-revision process 
that would transform some of what is now permanent uncertainty in estimation of the income distribution into 
transitory uncertainty.  Although it appears that the Census Bureau did not pursue this idea following the 
1973 study, it warrants renewed consideration today.  A recent study by Hokayem, Bollinger, and Ziliak 
(2014) explores what may be possible when CPS sample members are matched to their Social Security 
earnings records. 
 
 
4. Conceptual Uncertainty: Seasonal Adjustment of Official Statistics 
 
I wrote in the Introduction that conceptual uncertainty arises from incomplete understanding of the 
information that official statistics provide about well-defined economic concepts or from lack of clarity in the 
concepts themselves.  Section 2 mentioned one example, this being that the BEA re-evaluates its operational 
definition of GDP every five years and revises the historical GDP record accordingly.  Morgenstern (1963a) 
discussed difficulties in defining national income in Chapter XIV, Section 2.  Earlier, Kuznets (1948) offered 
a broad appraisal of the many conceptual issues. 
Another example arises in BLS measurement of unemployment.  The BLS classifies CPS respondents 
as unemployed if they "do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are 
currently available for work."14  Responses to a sequence of CPS questions are used to determine whether a 
                                                 
14 See www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm#unemployed. 
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person has "actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks" and is "currently available for work."  The notions 
of actively looking for work and being currently available for work are inherently vague to some degree, so 
there is resulting uncertainty about how unemployment statistics should be interpreted. 
 
4.1. Seasonal Adjustment in Principle and Practice 
 
A particularly troubling conceptual uncertainty arises in the conventional practice of seasonally 
adjusting official statistics, including quarterly GDP estimates and monthly unemployment rates.  Viewed 
from a sufficiently high altitude, the purpose of seasonal adjustment appears straightforward to explain.  
However, it is much less clear from ground level how one should actually perform seasonal adjustment. 
The BLS explains seasonal adjustment of employment statistics this way (U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2001): 
"What is seasonal adjustment?  Seasonal adjustment is a statistical technique that attempts to measure 
and remove the influences of predictable seasonal patterns to reveal how employment and 
unemployment change from month to month.  Over the course of a year, the size of the labor force, 
the levels of employment and unemployment, and other measures of labor market activity undergo 
fluctuations due to seasonal events including changes in weather, harvests, major holidays, and 
school schedules.  Because these seasonal events follow a more or less regular pattern each year, their 
influence on statistical trends can be eliminated by seasonally adjusting the statistics from month to 
month.  These seasonal adjustments make it easier to observe the cyclical, underlying trend, and other 
nonseasonal movements in the series." 
The explanation is heuristically appealing but it does not specify how, in practice, one may "remove the 
influences of predictable seasonal patterns." 
Views on appropriate ways to perform seasonal adjustment have long varied.  See, for example, the 
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exchange between Granger (1978) and Sims (1978) as well as the recent contribution of Wright (2013).  The 
absence of consensus about the right way to perform seasonal adjustment has also played a role in policy 
debates.  A fascinating instance appears in a 1961 letter to the Editor of the New York Times written by Paul 
Samuelson, who served as an economic advisor to President Kennedy. 
Samuelson (1961) compares the time series of unemployment that emerge with two methods of 
seasonally adjusting the unemployment rate, one being the then official BLS method and the other called the 
"residual method."  He writes: 
"The American economy has been in a fairly vigorous rise ever since last February. Everything seems 
to be improving: production, income, wages and profits.  The one flaw in the picture has been the 
apparent failure of unemployment to improve.  At last report (October) 6.8 percent of our civilian 
labor force was stated to be unemployed on a seasonally corrected basisCwhich suggests no 
improvement in the level that we have been experiencing for the previous eleven months of recession 
and recovery.  How can we square this with the fact that the Federal Reserve Board's index of 
physical production has risen from its February low by about 10 percent? . . . . I should like to 
suggest that the answer is a simple one. . . . . While correct in presenting the ground level of our 
joblessness and its long-term trends, the official method of seasonally correcting raw unemployment 
statistics to arrive at the best estimate of unemployment is open to reasonable questioning. . . . If you 
replace the official method by an alternative technical method sponsored by a number of academic 
and other experts (the so-called "residual method". . . .), you find that unemployment has been falling 
steadily from its February peak of 7.2 per cent of the labor force to the October level of 6.4 per cent." 
Thus, Samuelson points out that use of the residual method to seasonally adjust the unemployment rate yields 
a distinctly more positive conclusion regarding the success of the Kennedy economic policy than does use of 
the official BLS method. 
Today the BLS uses the X-12-ARIMA method, developed by the Census Bureau and described in 
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Findley et al. (1998).  The X-12 method, along with its predecessor X-11 and successor X-13, may be a 
sophisticated and successful algorithm for seasonal adjustment.  Or it may be an unfathomable black box 
containing a complex set of statistical operations that lack economic foundation.  Wright (2013) eloquently 
expresses the difficulty of understanding X-12, writing (p. 67): 
"Most academics treat seasonal adjustment as a very mundane job, rumored to be undertaken by 
hobbits living in holes in the ground. I believe that this is a terrible mistake, but one in which the 
statistical agencies share at least a little of the blame. Statistical agencies emphasize SA data (and in 
some cases don't even publish NSA data), and while they generally document their seasonal 
adjustment process thoroughly, it is not always done in a way that facilitates replication, or 
encourages entry into this research area." 
Wright's remark that statistical agencies sometimes do not publish non-seasonally-adjusted (NSA) data refers 
particularly to a decision of the BEA to stop publication of non-adjusted GDP estimates.  He comments on 
this as follows (p. 79): 
"It is very unfortunate that for the most basic measure of economic activity in the largest country in 
the world, researchers are effectively prevented from evaluating any difficulties associated with 
seasonal adjustment."15 
Understanding the practice of seasonal adjustment matters because, as Wright states (p. 65): 
                                                 
15 Curious as to why the BEA stopped publication of NSA GDP estimates, I posed the question to 
Dennis Fixler, Chief Statistician of the BEA, in an email message.  He replied (email, May 12, 2014): 
"regarding the comment made by Jonathan Wright, we had to drop the non-seasonally adjusted BEA 
data for budget reasons.  Unfortunately, our budget is quite tight and the prospects for increases are 
not great.  Consequently, there are no plans to reinstitute these data." 
In a later message, he elaborated on the reasons why publication of non-adjusted GDP estimates is costly, 
stating (email, May 15, 2014): 
"Much of BEA=s source data for GDP comes from the source data agencies already seasonally 
adjusted (we don=t get the unadjusted data), and separate collections were needed for the unadjusted 
estimates, and a good deal of work was needed to produce the non-seasonally adjusted estimates. 
Also, until the third annual revision vintage estimates, the GDP estimates contain some judgmental 
inputs that are inherently seasonally adjusted."   
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"Seasonal adjustment is extraordinarily consequential." He gives this example concerning BLS reporting of 
estimates of non-farm payrolls (p. 65): "In monthly change, the average absolute difference between the SA 
and NSA number is 660,000, which dwarfs the normal month-over-month variation in the SA data.  All this 
implies that we should think very carefully about how seasonal adjustment is done." 
Fifty years earlier Morgenstern (1963a) similarly warned against over-interpretation of month-to-
month movements in seasonally adjusted unemployment rates.  He wrote (p. 239): 
"It is not uncommon, indeed it is frequent, to find the government making strong statements about 
developments in unemployment over periods as short as one (!) month.  The nation's largest or most 
important newspapers play up a "drop" in the unemployment rate, say from 5.8% to 5.5% as a highly 
significant event and the Secretary of Labor will not hesitate to make speeches on that occasion.  All 
this is done on the basis of "seasonal correction" and dealing with figures given to four "significant" 
digits.  It is, of course, clear that statements of this kind are completely devoid of the meaning 
attributed to them." 
 
4.2. Measurement of Uncertainty Associated with Seasonal Adjustment 
 
There presently exists no clearly appropriate way to measure the conceptual uncertainty associated 
with seasonal adjustment.  The Census Bureau's X-12 is an algorithm, not a method based on a well-specified 
dynamic theory of the economy.  Hence, it is not obvious how to evaluate the extent to which it accomplishes 
the objective of removing the influences of predictable seasonal patterns.  One might perhaps juxtapose X-12 
with other seemingly reasonable algorithms, perform seasonal adjustment with each one, and view the range 
of resulting estimates as a measure of conceptual uncertainty. 
More principled ways to evaluate uncertainty may open up if statistical agencies were to use a 
seasonal adjustment method derived from a well-specified model of the economy.  One could then assess the 
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sensitivity of seasonally adjusted estimates to variation in the parameters and the basic structure of the model. 
A more radical departure from present practice would be to abandon seasonal adjustment and leave it 
to the users of official statistics to interpret unadjusted statistics as they choose.  Publication of unadjusted 
statistics should be particularly valuable to users who want to make year-to-year rather than month-to-month 
comparison of statistics.  Suppose, for example, that one wants to compare unemployment in March 2013 and 
March 2014.  It is arguably more reasonable to compare the unadjusted estimates for these months than to 
compare the seasonally adjusted estimates.  Comparison of unadjusted estimates for the same month each year 
(March in this case) sensibly removes the "influences of predictable seasonal patterns" that the BLS noted in 
its 2001 document. Moreover, it compares data actually collected in the two months of interest.  In contrast, 
the seasonally adjusted estimates for March 2013 and March 2014 are comprised of data collected not only in 
these months but over a lengthy prior period. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Over fifty years ago, Oskar Morgenstern urgently argued for regular measurement of error in official 
economic statistics.  He made a considerable effort to change the prevailing practices of federal statistical 
agencies in the United States, writing two editions of On the Accuracy of Economic Observations and articles 
summarizing the book.  He was well-placed to influence the status quo, being famous for his contribution to 
game theory and situated prominently at Princeton.  Yet his efforts did not bear fruit.  Nor have agencies 
adhered to the Committee on National Statistics call for "Openness about Sources and Limitations of the Data 
Provided" in Principles and Practices for a Federal Statistical Agency.   
Why is it that federal statistical agencies still do so little to communicate uncertainty in official 
statistics?  I am unaware of any valid professional reason that would explain the failure of the BLS and 
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Census to report measures of sampling error in their news releases of employment and income statistics.  
These agencies know how to measure sampling error and they do so in their technical documents.  Private 
survey organizations routinely state a sampling "margin of error" in their news releases. 
Considering nonsampling error, one might fault Morgenstern, a sharp critic of agency practices, for 
not proposing specific constructive ways to measure such errors.  Nor does the CNSTAT document propose 
measurement ideas.  Yet I do not think that this explains the continuing reluctance of statistical agencies to 
quantify nonsampling error. 
This article has suggested several specific actions that agencies could take now, implementing ideas 
that have already been developed.  Emulating the Bank of England, the BEA could prepare and publish fan 
charts to depict uncertainty in the GDP revision process.  The BLS and Census Bureau could use no-
assumptions interval estimates or more informative interval imputations to communicate uncertainty 
generated by survey nonresponse.  Agencies that seasonally adjust official statistics could make available 
unadjusted statistics.
Going further, agency administrators could task their research staffs to develop measures of 
nonsampling error, perhaps in collaboration with external econometricians and statisticians.  Federal statistical 
agencies have previously allocated resources to develop the methods now used to weight, impute, and 
seasonally adjust official statistics.  They could similarly develop ways to measure nonsampling error.  
Generation of useful measurement methods will require agencies to exercise judgement, but this is no reason 
to deter them from making the effort.  Agencies already make judgements when they extrapolate trends to 
construct advance GDP estimates, when they use weights and imputations to deal with survey nonresponse, 
and when they seasonally adjust a multitude of statistics.  They implicitly judge nonsampling error to be 
inconsequential when they choose not to quantify it.  They should reject this flawed implicit judgement and 
use their professional expertise to develop useful measures of nonsampling error. 
While I cannot conjure a valid professional explanation for the status quo, I do see a possible political 
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explanation.  I have elsewhere observed that policy makers and the public appear to want to receive policy 
analysis that expresses certitude, even though the certitude may lack credibility (Manski, 2011; 2013, Chapter 
1).  I was referring then to incentives for incredible certitude facing researchers and government agencies that 
predict policy outcomes.16  Federal statistical agencies may similarly perceive an incentive to express 
incredible certitude about the state of the economy when they publish official economic statistics. 
Morgenstern (1963) comments cogently on the political incentives facing statistical agencies when he 
writes (p. 11): 
                                                 
16 For example, a core function of the Congressional Budget Office is to make ten-year point 
predictions of the budgetary impact of pending legislation. These predictions, called scores, are conveyed in 
letters that the Director writes to leaders of Congress and chairs of Congressional committees.  They are not 
accompanied by any measures of uncertainty, even though legislation often proposes complex changes to 
federal law, whose budgetary implications must be difficult to foresee. 
"Finally, we mention a serious organizational difficulty in discussing and criticizing statistics.  These 
are virtually always produced by large organizations, government or private; and these organizations 
are frequently mutually dependent upon each other in order to function normally.  Often one office 
cannot publicly raise questions about the work of another, even when it suspects the quality of the 
work, since this might adversely affect bureaucratic-diplomatic relations between the two and the 
flow of information from one office to another might be hampered.  A marked esprit de corps 
prevails.  All offices must try to impress the public with the quality of their work.  Should too many 
doubts be raised, financial support from Congress or other sources may not be forthcoming.  More 
than once has it happened that Congressional appropriations were endangered when it was suspected 
that government statistics might not be 100 percent accurate.  It is natural, therefore, that various 
offices will defend the quality of their work even to an unreasonable degree." 
Later, Morgenstern cites these political pressures as a reason that agencies publish official statistics with 
unjustifiable detail, a phenomenon that he calls (Chapter III) "Specious Accuracy." 
Not having the persuasive power of Congressional appropriations, I can only say that federal 
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statistical agencies would better inform policymakers and the public if they were to measure and communicate 
important uncertainties in official statistics.  Should agencies take the task seriously, I think it likely that they 
will want to develop separate strategies for communication of uncertainty in news releases and in technical 
documentation of official statistics. 
News releases are brief and are aimed at a broad audience.  Hence, they have only a limited ability to 
convey nuance.  It will be challenging for agencies to write releases that effectively quantify both sampling 
and nonsampling error, but it is important that they do so.  Agencies have more scope for communication of 
uncertainty in their technical documentation of official statistics.  The possibilities grow as the norm in 
documentation moves away from publication of periodic reports and towards development of web-based 
software that enables the users of official statistics to flexibly access and study the available data. 
An open question is how communication of uncertainty would affect policymaking and private 
decision making.  We now have little understanding of the ways that users of official statistics interpret them. 
 Some may mistakenly take the statistics at face value.  Others may conjecture that the statistics are prone to 
errors of varying directions and magnitudes.  We know essentially nothing about how decision making would 
change if statistical agencies were to communicate uncertainty regularly and transparently. 
Consider, for example, the use by policy makers of early estimates of GDP growth.  An anonymous 
reviewer of this article posed a set of pertinent questions, which I paraphrase as follows: (1) Are policy 
decisions ever made on the basis of early estimates or is it an accepted fact that early numbers are such bad 
predictors that policy makers avoid them altogether?  (2) What is the cost of incorrect policy decisions made 
based on early numbers?  (3) Would policy decisions be different in the absence of early numbers?  (4) 
Would policy decisions be different had BEA reported a measure of uncertainty? 
Analogous questions should be asked about policy making with household income statistics based on 
surveys with large nonresponse, with seasonally adjusted employment statistics, and with many other official 
statistics that now suppress measurement of uncertainty.  I urge behavioral and social scientists to initiate 
 
 
37 
empirical studies that would shed light on these matters. 
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